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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
“Let’s Call Painful Sex Disorders Sexual Disabilities Instead” 
A Feminist Disability Critique Of Feminist Representations And Medical 
Representations Of Sexual Disorders Of Pain 
 by 
Oyku Akin 
 
 
Advisor: Linda Alcoff 
 
 
Historically, gender and sexuality have been privileged sites of analysis in feminist theory. 
Critical feminist engagements with “sexual dysfunction” employ gendered analysis’ of medical 
and pharmaceutical interventions to sexuality in capitalist modernity in order to underscore the 
ideological dimensions of modern sexuality. Although sexual disorders of pain received little 
attention from feminist academics until recently, contemporary feminist work on sexual pain 
disorders mimic the previous work on sexual dysfunctions in terms of analysis. Analysing recent 
major feminist contributions employing different epistemological orientations to the study sexual 
disorders of pain, I show that gender continues to be the privileged common category of analysis 
in studying sexuality and sexual disorders with major weaknesses. On the one hand, these 
feminists are able to present a critique of gendered sexual oppression reminiscent of second-wave 
feminist interrogations of sexual oppression and heterosexuality in what is considered a post-
feminist era of sex. On the other hand, they use sexual disabilities as a shortcut, sacrificing its 
difference as a specific form of embodiment/oppression, along with its potential for producing a 
productive and transformative politics. I use a feminist/queer disability studies perspective to 
discuss these shortcomings and to suggest a different way to conceptualize sexual politics. 
Keywords: Chronic Sexual Pain, Genito-Pelvic Pain Disorder/ Penetration Disorder, Vaginismus, 
Feminist Disability Studies, Crip Studies, sexual oppression 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2013 a newly updated DSM-V  redefined female sexual disorders of pain, 
creating the umbrella term Genito-Pelvic Pain Disorder/ Penetration Disorder which 
covers a wide range of symptoms and complaints under its roof (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). The specific category of sexual disorders of pain had 
not gone under any significant changes since vaginismus was added alongside to 
Dyspareunia in DSM-III at 1980 (American Psychiatric Association, 1980). 
Compared to other sexual disorders identified in DSM that are associated with desire, 
arousal, and orgasm, disorders of sexual pain had a rather low profile both in terms 
of medical research as well as public discussion and social (and feminist) critique 
until very recently.  
In the past two decades, Leonore Tiefer and The New View Campaign 
generated a particularly influential discourse critiquing medical and pharmaceutical 
interventions to sexuality, arguing that medical approaches depoliticized sex and 
promoted a mechanistic view of sexual desire (Kaschak & Tiefer, 2001). The New 
View Campaign operated as a grassroots network between 2000-2016 and defined 
their goal as challenging the pharmaceutical industry’s reduction of sexual problems 
to medical matters and biology. They produced a critique of the efforts to introduce a 
‘pink viagra’ to enhance sexual desire for women who suffer from “low desire” and 
other biomedical oriented research in sexuality.  
Roughly at the same time The New View published their manifesto, a group 
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of medical researchers started questioning the validity of the medical research on 
sexual pain disorders and sex therapies, questioning the “sexual” nature of pain, 
diagnostic criteria, and assumptions guiding treatments (Binik, Meana, Berkley & 
Kalifé, 1999). They emphasized empirical concerns, but they also marked feminist 
concerns, including the importance placed on achieving intercourse.  
These two critical approaches produced literature in their respective fields 
with limited dialogue. Although feminist critiques of medicalization managed to 
influence research on sexual problems and sexual therapy to some degree, new 
medical orientations towards understanding vulvar pain beyond its association with 
penetrative sex received mixed responses from feminists, with some arguing that 
desexualizing pain could bury its already concealed political nature even deeper 
under a sophisticated medical discourse. In a published response to Binik and his 
team’s proposal to reclassify vaginismus and dyspareunia as disorders of pain rather 
than sexual disorders, Tiefer suggested that such a move would be a disservice to 
women who suffer such problems as long as “sexual disorders” existed in DSM 
(Binik, 2005; Peer Commentaries, 2005). This difference in opinion about the proper 
place of pain related to sexual activity in the DSM betrays a deeper tension between 
feminist and medical perspectives that shaped the subsequent feminist engagements 
with vaginismus and dyspareunia, and the changes in the category of sexual pain 
disorders in DSM-V. The tension itself however, as I argue, has been taken for 
granted to some degree in feminist analysis, preventing a critical interrogation and 
incorporation of possibilities that could emerge from a critical medical approach, and 
depriving this new medical perspective from feminist insight at a much deeper level.  
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 In the meantime, sexual disorders of pain slowly gained visibility. Feminist 
approaches studied how heterosexual women experienced sexual disorders of pain 
surrounded by a heteronormative sexual regime and medical authorities who 
dismissed their concerns (Ayling & Ussher, 2008; Cacchioni, 2015; Cacchioni & 
Wolkowitz, 2011; Farrell & Cacchioni, 2012; Labuski, 2015; Svedhem, Eckert & 
Wijma, 2013). Medical research produced a critique of the category and proposed 
new frameworks for engaging with diagnosis and treatments (Bergeron, Rosen & 
Morin 2011; Bergeron, Corsini-Munt, Aerts, Rancourt & Rosen 2015; Binik, 2005; 
Meana, 2009; Meana, Fertel & Maykut, 2017; Payne, Reissing, Lahaie, Binik, Amsel 
& Khalifé 2006; Rosen & Bergeron, 2018). Chronic sexual pain became a growing 
market for non-medical interventions and technology, with special lubes and gadgets 
for relieving pain marketed towards afflicted women recently. Finally people with 
dyspareunia and vaginismus published essays online, producing rare cultural and 
popular representations of chronic pain with intercourse.  
Researching popular representations of sexual disorders of pain, I came 
across a blog post titled “Let’s Call Painful Sex Disorders Sexual Disabilities 
Instead” (Zulch, 2017). In this personal essay about vaginismus, the author, a trans 
man with multiple disabilities, discusses how he understands his experience with 
vaginismus in terms of a sexual disability rather than a painful sex disorder because 
the latter implies a total inability to enjoy sex. Emphasizing that queer and disabled 
people have multiple ways of engaging with and enjoying sex, the author suggests 
that even if one is committed to getting treatment to have intercourse, they can enjoy 
sex in other ways; a possibility that gets lost in the term “painful sex disorder”. In 
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many ways, this short essay stands apart from academic representations of sexual 
disorders of pain. The afflicted person is the author, a queer, trans man, who 
acknowledges that people may not seek or want to go through with treatment doctors 
prescribe, yet does not cast queering sex and getting treatment as opposing political 
choices, and offhandedly combines disability and sexuality in his text, showing how 
the two can be thought together. This is a rather flexible stance, as I discuss later in 
detail, because different feminists tend to frame both getting treatment and not 
getting treatment as complying with and reproducing heteronormativity. 
Neither feminist nor medical perspectives on the issue account for such 
flexibility. Although medical research started to pay attention to social contexts that 
could produce and sustain this kind of pain, and there are more voices within the 
medical community that problematize the primacy of intercourse as a focus of 
treatment and people’s lack of access to healthcare, it is unlikely that a political 
critique or vision towards social justice can emerge from the medical community. 
Feminist social analysis of sexual disorders of pain explicitly deals with it as a 
political problem produced through gendered sexual oppression. However, it also 
fails to address or accommodate the positions described above (queer, disabled, 
trans)  in a consistent political discourse, which diminishes its analytical power. Not 
engaging with the critical medical discourse furthermore prevents the emergence of a 
comprehensive social justice intervention to medical discourses. If medical 
discourses are necessary targets of not only criticism but also feminist 
transformations, more inter-disciplinery work could e the key to progress. 
In this essay, I want to trace the possibilities that emerge from calling sexual 
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pain disorders sexual disabilities. What happens if we try to address sexual pain 
disorders from  queer/feminist disability perspectives? How can feminist, queer 
disability perspectives challenge the ways feminists think about pain with 
intercourse? How can we locate this particular sexual disability within feminist 
philosophies of embodiment? Finally, why should we and what insight we can gain 
from this particular issue that could embolden our horizons of thinking and acting?  
Answering these questions all at once is not an easy task. It is an easier task than it 
would have been, if disability scholars have not already grappled with the effects of 
chronic pain and illness in (re)conceptualizing disability (Crow, 1996; Wendell, 
2001), addressed the conditions of invisibility of specific disabilities such as mental 
disabilities (Donaldson, 2002; Lewis, 2006; Mollow, 2013; Price, 2015), 
problematized sexuality and disability together (Baril, 2015; McRuer & Mollow, 
2012; Wilkerson, 2012). Yet, when gender, sexuality, and disability come together in 
these discussions, the bodies that are discussed are rarely heterosexual cis women 
with sexual dysfunctions that feminist and medical discourses represent as afflicted 
with vaginismus and dyspareunia.  Still, a trans man’s call to rejecting the label of 
painful sex disorder can also serve as a wake-up call to the diversity of people who 
are afflicted, which is often ignored both in medical and feminist discussions. 
Though diversity by itself may not be a good enough reason to argue for a disability 
conceptualization and critique of sexual disorders of pain, I argue that a 
feminist/queer disability framework can go beyond current feminist discourses for 
producing a politics for sexual pain disorders. Another potential of such an 
engagement lies in the ways it can foster alliances across different theoretical 
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orientations, disciplines and political agendas for better ways of thinking and 
advocating sexual agency in the face of oppression (Wilkerson, 2012).  
 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
 
If everything is socially constructed then nothing is. 
If there is one claim that cuts across all humanities, and shape the ways we 
understand, research a the world, that claim is that identities are socially constructed. 
Social construction is a valuable conceptual tool for revealing how structural 
operations of power create and hide hierarchies among people as natural facts of life. 
All across the humanities, researchers critically investigate the social constructions of 
normal and pathological, not only to understand and make transparent the processes 
of normalization and pathologization but also to liberate bodies from the experience 
of oppression. An underlying claim around most of this research is that there are no 
normal bodies as such and that pathologized and stigmatized difference is 
contextually bound to changes in historical and material realities, that are ordered 
differently to exclude and include, oppress and liberate certain bodies. Criminology, 
feminist, queer, disability, postcolonial and critical race theories share the insight that 
criminalization/pathologization of certain bodies and experiences works to create and 
sustain the legitimacy of the myth of “normal/healthy” bodies and experiences, 
which in turn function to structure social life in hierarchies of exclusion and 
inclusion. 
     However, there is also a historically and materially built tendency -a socially 
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constructed tendency if you will, especially in social sciences and humanities to 
study the exotic and the powerless, that has little to do with liberation (the roots of 
anthropology as a discipline testifies very well to this fact). A generous way to frame 
this tendency at present would be to say that it is a habit that continues to haunt 
social sciences. At this point, the intent might be less important than the context - in 
many ways, it is easier to study structures of oppression through the lives of the 
oppressed rather than the privileged, because it is so much easier to access the lives 
of marginalized people. This uneven application itself has the power of legitimizing 
and justifying certain behaviours, desires and fears as more or less real than others. 
This focus, coupled with the importance and necessity of political direction for 
liberation sometimes creates a representation of reality in which marginalized come 
to occupy a strange position as facilitators of their oppression and the ones who are 
supposed to sacrifice their ‘socially constructed’ desires for the good of all. The 
problem is that, although one can argue all desires and fears are socially constructed, 
they could also be critical to one’s safety, survival and sense of self. When social 
constructivist approaches abstract the world within this implicit hierarchy of desires 
and fears, often it is marginalized people who are expected to sacrifice their truths 
and needs. Recent years marked a turn towards embodiment and materiality from 
social constructivist explanations for gender, sexuality and disability studies. These 
interventions come from actual bodies whose differences cannot be abstracted to fit 
existing forms of social analysis. Critiques of social models of trans and disability 
identities (sometimes both at the same time) question the effectiveness of the social 
model for addressing and accounting for the needs of trans and disabled people who 
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experience varying degrees of oppression across a spectrum of social and bodily 
conditions. I have been particularly inspired by These critiques underscore a diversity 
of experiences and oppressions shaped by intersecting identities of race, class, 
ethnicity, gender, sexuality, age, ability. I will show how critiques raised in these 
discourses can help us address feminist representations of sexual disorders.  
DISABILITY LIKE GENDER  
 
“Is it not necessary, to at least ask if there is a difference between 
disability/impairment and gender/sex—and, since there obviously is, how that 
difference operates in the present situation?” (Samuels, 2002). 
Discussing a pain/penetration disorder in terms of a disability challenge the 
disciplinary boundaries between gender/disability studies. Genitalia is often 
considered as belonging to queer or gender studies domains, as a marker of sexual 
difference (Baril, 2015). However, it is also a condition that ableist norms of 
sexuality cannot contain. Feminist engagements with pain/penetration disorder 
discuss the norms of sexuality in terms of heteronormativity and cultural misogyny 
rather than ableism. The social experience of gender is thought to cause both 
impairments in the body and oppression through the social organization of gender. It 
is important that impairment is understood as a bodily condition rather than a 
psychiatric or mental condition in feminist readings that acknowledge the importance 
of pain. This can be partly explained by some feminisms relation to anti-psychiatry 
movement, a stance that also has roots in feminist critiques of medicalization (Angel, 
2012). 
The dominant model of constructivism in disability studies locate the origins 
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of disability in the social world and its politics, placing body and its politics in the 
periphery of this frame, as the effects of discursive construction (Garland-Thomson, 
2005). When it comes to mental illnesses, being the effect of a discursive production 
haunts accounts of madness. Feminist anti-psychiatric readings of  ‘mad woman’ 
influence both popular and official discourses of madness, meanwhile erasing the 
actual experience of being a mad woman (Donaldson, 2002).  Similarly queer 
accounts of social oppression use psychotic breakdowns and painful experiences 
such as self-cutting as metaphors and idioms which negate the real implications of 
these experiences (Johnson, 2015). These engagements bypass the pain of cutting 
and being mad but use them to furnish a rebellious desire towards embracing painful 
experiences that can be generalized into identity categories such as women or queer. 
This move however, ignores such pain is not equally distributed neither within nor 
across these categories. Problematizing the desirability of disability means to pay 
attention to pain and recognize the ways pain complicates a disability desire.  
This is not a complete dismissal of desire. It is a move highlighting the 
importance of tending to pain and undesirability which, typically goes unmentioned 
in disability studies (Price, 2015). Raising the issue of undesirability in this way 
necessitates questioning and re-working the impairment/disability divide in 
significant ways, a move Kim Hall describes as “reconceptualizing disability and the 
body as sites of becoming rather than of being and as sites of affirmation” (Hall, 
2015). 
What is necessary for such reconceptualizations of body and disability? If 
body -and impairment- are not neutral backgrounds, how does that affect our 
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politics?  In Disability Studies, Anna Mollow’s intersectional reading of Meri Nana-
Ama Danquah's account of depression demonstrates on the one hand that impairment 
itself can be political while at the same time showing that painful experience of 
depression shouldn’t be simply negated as discourse (2006). Engaging with Shelly 
Tremain’s argument that individuals reliance upon impairment categories serve to 
reproduce hegemonic constructions of disability (2005), Mollow considers the 
possible effects of recognizing depression as a definable and describable disease. 
Through a careful analysis of Danquah’s narrative, she points out how Danquah 
subverts the hegemonic discourse of disability. Danquah not only connects her 
depression to her social position as a black woman but also reveals how the medical 
diagnosis is selectively deployed in racialized and gendered lines of power. Thus, 
Mollow argues that a black woman’s access to depression diagnosis can itself be a 
resistant practice which undermines the always already political expectation that 
black women suffer quietly and stoically.  
The politicization of impairment through taking despair as an embodied 
condition is important and points out that relations between body and social worth 
exploring. Elizabeth Wilson (2011) suggests that instead of completely rejecting 
medical or social models, we need to rework both of them. This is precisely the effort 
Wilson makes in her book Gut Feminism (2015). While she suggests that feminism 
should overcome its anti-biological stance, she argues that the recent attempts to 
include biology are problematic due to an uncritical over-reliance on the claims of 
neuroscience which prioritizes brain and nervous system over the whole body. Thus 
she tries to establish a new frame for understanding depression, asserting that “such a 
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framework would need to be able to handle how the pharmacokinetic, psychological, 
and social realms both align and dissociate, how they are antagonistically 
attached...one name for such a framework might be transference” (p.106). Discussing 
the clinically unstable history of melancholy and the importance of signs and 
symptoms in its diagnosis, she suggests that medical and social models compete to 
find a primary cause and locate the cure in that position. Drawing attention to the 
physical symptoms of depression (eating, sleeping, vitality), she articulates 
psychoanalysis and psychopharmacology as different lines of attack into the same 
bioaffective system. She points out that clinical researches show the quality of the 
relationship between therapist and client, rather than the specific mode of therapy 
(whether psychoanalytic or behavioral) is more effective in curing depression. 
Wilson marks that it is the intervention into the patterns of the relationality of the 
patient, in which body-mind, affect, social and politics are entangled with, that cures 
(p.119).  For Wilson, transference is not a psychoanalytic concept explaining 
depression. She is trying to introduce a way of framing effects and experiences cross-
cutting bodies, minds, environments, and social worlds we usually define in linear 
successions, within a different relationality, outside established duality of political 
and biological. Her critique points out that a political discussion of depression 
remains quite limited if it continues to unfold around the morality of pharmacological 
intervention. This means that interrogating the economic and political organization of  
pharmacological intervention by itself, without also considering the content of 
pharmacological intervention (as in the chemicals in the body and how they move) 
locates biology (as science and as phenomena) beyond politics. Sociopolitic 
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explanations of depression, according to Wilson, usually fall into this trap of treating 
the medical or biological knowledge as a monolithic technology, instead of a 
dynamic field of knowledge production, which naturalizes medicine itself. 
CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST APPROACHES TO SEXUAL PAIN DISORDERS 
 
In the past decade, along with a couple of articles, two book-length qualitative, 
empirical studies dealing with sexual pain disorders came out, analyzing the social 
and cultural relations of sexual pain: Big Pharma, Women, And The Labour Of Love 
by Thea Cacchioni (2015)  and It Hurts Down There: The Bodily Imaginaries of 
Female Genital Pain (2015)  by Christine Labuski. These recently published 
ethnographic works draw from significantly different feminist literatures and use 
different frameworks in their analysis. Although they seem to be in different camps 
due to their different views on the importance of medical recognition and treatment 
of sexual pain, I argue that the assumptions that guide them in bridging politics and 
sexuality limit both projects in similar ways, especially when it comes to articulating 
a feminist political vision of sexual pain. 
Thea Cacchioni is among the few in New View campaign to engage with 
sexual pain disorders. As I discussed before, The New view campaign mostly 
focused on the medicalization of sexual desire, rather than pain, in order to challenge 
the pharmaceutical efforts produce a desire enhancing pill for women. In Big 
Pharma, Women, And The Labour Of Love (2015) Cacchioni builds upon her 
dissertation work and her subsequent research on medicalization. Emphasizing that 
feminist work on medicalization rarely attends women’s voices, especially on issues 
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related to pain, Cacchioni uses her qualitative empirical research with “women who 
perceive themselves as having sexual problems” (p. 3) and physicians who attended 
them in Vancouver in early 2000s. Her analysis frames her empirical research in two 
axes of biomedicalization and heteronormativity. Big Pharma, Women, And The 
Labour Of Love is not entirely about the medicalization of sexual pain, but Cacchioni 
argues that pain holds an important place in her discussions and devotes a chapter to 
it, as well as bringing it up throughout the book. In many ways, Cacchioni’s 
discussion parallels the social model of understanding disability. 
Like Cacchioni, Christine Labuski conducted qualitative research in a clinic 
that specializes in treating sexual pain disorders. Her analysis brings together theories 
of embodiment and feminist materialisms to provide a framework for understanding 
vulval pain as an embodied condition rooted in social relations. Her model is more 
closely aligned to disability approaches that discuss the materiality of body-mind and 
emphasize the importance of pain in conceptualizing disability. 
CAUSES OF SEXUAL PAIN 
 
     The authors’ approach to explaining causes of chronic sexual/vulval pain 
differ in some ways although they both operate from the assumption that it is a 
condition best understood in its relation to gender. In explaining the causes of 
chronic sexual pain, Cacchioni refers to The New View literature, critiquing 
medicine’s emphasis on biology in explaining and treating biopsychosocial problems 
(p.42,43). She argues that along with other sexual disorders, causes of sexual 
disorders of pain can be understood as political rather than biological, although she 
does not explain how and which politics may be the reason for chronic sexual pain. 
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She acknowledges that patients, therapists, and medical researchers are mostly in 
agreement that chronic sexual pain is not directly related to a history of sexual abuse, 
as opposed to the common understanding of the issue (p.49,50). So while she 
maintains that politics are related to the emergence of this kind of pain, instead of 
making direct connections, she concentrates her efforts on critiquing the politics that 
govern the experience of pain; which in her view are best understood in terms of 
medicalization and compulsory heterosexuality (p. 114). 
Labuski however, devotes most of her book to provide a theoretical 
explanation of chronic vulvar pain, through feminist science studies and new 
materialisms, to articulate this phenomenon as a product of relations between the 
body and social world. She explicitly refers to Elizabeth Wilson’s Gut Feminism as a 
prominent influence, however, unlike Wilson whose approach is distinguished for 
rejecting the separability of social and biological causes and the critique of the search 
for a primary cause for embodied experience either within the social or biological 
body, Labuski insists that origins of vulval pain are located in the social domain 
(249, 256). Although her arguments regarding how and why this is the case are 
wrapped in a complex theoretical discussion, these causes can be summarized as lack 
of knowledge and education, sexual repression, religious and conservative attitudes 
towards sexuality, social hostility towards women’s sexuality and sexual abuse.  
REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN WHO SEEK TREATMENT 
 
 
Cacchioni doesn’t deny women’s claims of experiencing pain during 
intercourse but argues that experience of pain doesn’t necessitate recognizing it as a 
medical problem or a disorder, and she focuses on women’s perceptions of their 
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conditions (p. 3,4,5). She asserts that women perceive themselves as having sexual 
problems because they fail to conform to dominant sexual scripts (p. 66,79). Pain 
with intercourse gains significance because intercourse is prized above all other sex 
(p. 78,79,80). In other words, women wouldn’t have such problems -or at least would 
not perceive these issues as problems- if a heteronormative patriarchal society did not 
demand it. Thus, women seek treatment to conform to existing social and sexual 
norms. It is also important to note that Cacchioni mainly treats dyspareunia and 
vaginismus as almost exclusively as sexual problems, without going into detail about 
how pelvic pain might also affect different dimensions of women’s lives. Labuski, on 
the other hand, takes a different approach by emphasizing the toll vulval pain takes 
on women’s sexual, social and physic lives. In her account, seeking treatment is not 
characterized solely by a desire to conform to sexual norms and expectations, but 
marks women’s investment in their social and sexual well beings.  
This stark difference in reading women’s desire for seeking treatment causes 
a symmetrical opposition in how women’s experiences with treatment are understood 
by the authors. For example, for Cacchioni women who decide to stop treatment and 
disavow “labor of love” despite the heavy social and interpersonal burdens that come 
with such a move are bold (p.108) , whereas Labuski marks that getting through 
treatment is not for the faint-hearted (p. 107).   
Authors’ understandings of why women seek treatment also influence the 
ways they discuss the anxiety and distress women express. Cacchioni, for example 
emphasizes the coital imperative as the major source of distress for women and pays 
more attention to how women understand and navigate sexual expectations they feel 
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obligated to fulfill (p. 79,80,84), while Labuski pays more attention to women’s 
backgrounds in terms of their sexual and medical histories, religious beliefs, attitudes 
towards their bodies and sexualities ( p. 41,47, 55, 183, 105, 134, 210) . However, 
neither provide an integrated account of how material and bodily differences (class, 
race, age, disability) may influence experiences of sexual pain (and its treatment), 
although both acknowledge that these are important aspects that should be 
considered.  
 
CONCEPTUALIZING TREATMENT 
 
    In conceptualizing the treatment of sexual pain, both Cacchioni and Labuski 
differentiate between pharmaceutical, surgical and physical therapy options available 
for treating sexual pain, both expressing a preference for physical therapy, though 
their conceptualization of physical therapy is remarkably different. Cacchioni argues 
that techniques of dilation, relaxation, tension release, and other cognitive behavior 
approaches associated with physical therapy can be considered demedicalized against 
a backdrop of creams, suppositories, pills, and surgical interventions (p.55-59). She 
also acknowledges that for some women this kind of treatment brings feelings of 
empowerment (p. 3,48). Labuski is more enthusiastic about empowering aspects of 
physical therapy, especially a form of it which she considers an inside-out approach 
that involves therapist’s manual contact with patients pelvic floor (p.104). Labuski 
frames this preference in her understanding of the relationship between social, 
emotional and biological causes of pelvic pain, although she points out that more 
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than a few women refuse to go through with physical therapy due to extreme anxiety 
they feel (p. 108, 109) . In a rather odd fashion, she quotes a patient as she describes 
being reminded of her past experiences of sexual abuse during a physical therapy 
session and rejected further treatment, to make her case for the effectiveness of 
physical therapy (p. 106-107). Both authors also acknowledge that women find the 
cost of physical therapy in terms of money and time rather frustrating.  
 
 
POLITICAL VISIONS 
 
Cacchioni’s approach stresses both compulsory sexuality and dominant 
scripts of sexuality that govern women’s experiences with sexual pain and other 
disorders. She analyses women’s experiences of unwilling deviancy from these 
forms of socially sanctioned forms of sex to interrogate whether subversive or 
transgressive sexuality can emerge. Cacchioni differentiates between subversive and 
transgressive sexualities by referring to Beasley et al. (2012). While transgressions 
are defined as non-deliberate, subversions are reflexive underminings that could 
change norms. Cacchioni considers actions of most of her informants as 
transgressive, as they refuse to comply with certain treatments, give up on 
heterosexual relationships or some heteronormative sexual norms. It is interesting 
that it is this last group Cachioni considers the most cheerful or upbeat about their 
situation, yet they are also among the transgressors. It seems that Cacchioni is 
questioning the very possibility of subversive sexuality, as she concludes that 
  18 
women’s choices and experiences of sex will always be shaped by social forces that 
go beyond sexuality and gender (p.117). Labuski emphasizes the importance of the 
cultural configuration of women’s sexuality as the main political object of her 
analysis. She defines and understands sexual pain as a matter of culturally produced 
alienation and disinvestment towards women’s sexuality, which governs women’s 
sexual selves and experiences, and thus frames the politics in terms of attending to 
those cultural forces (p. 147, 148, 241-249). 
These seemingly very different projects on sex pain unite on several issues. Even 
though they seem to be in opposite camps when it comes to medicalization, they 
express a preference for a type of treatment, they locate both the original cause of 
pain and the distressing experience it creates in the social world, and thus they 
articulate feminist concerns about how this social/cultural world needs to change. 
Although authors’ particular political visions and commitments shape their 
representations in different ways, political visions that emerge from these projects in 
terms of what is political about sexual pain and what a politics of sexual pain might 
look like follow the same lines of thought. For example, whether women seek 
medical attention against or for their interests in the long term, or whether this 
attention itself is part of the oppression or resistance, doesn’t make a difference in 
terms of what feminism can do for sexual pain or what sexual pain can do for 
feminism. 
According to Cacchioni medicalization hides the true (political) nature of 
women’s sexual problems by representing them as individual problems, foreclosing 
sexuality from political critique and action. Medicalization is a way of coercing 
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women into structures of compulsory sexuality and heteronormativity. Because 
medical treatment reproduces dominant ideas about gender and sexuality, she argues 
for a politics against further medicalization of the problem of chronic sexual pain. 
Cacchioni admits that medicalization of sexual pain is driven by women’s demands 
and it is very selectively accessible to a few among many, yet she does not explore 
these matters while discussing the role of medicalization in reproducing 
heteronormativity. Is heteronormativity an essential premise of medicalization or is 
that a form that can be challenged and transformed? If the latter is true, how is such a 
transformation is possible?  
Labuski answers yes to this question, by discussing at length what she sees as 
an empowering medical approach: Physical Therapy. In Labuski’s account, physical 
therapy reveals that women’s sexual pain is political by addressing embodied 
“cultural dis-ease” towards women’s sexuality (p. 26). Sexual pain is thus understood 
as embodied traumas of gender created by cultural attitudes towards and sex such as 
conservatism, ignorance, and abuse, which are the targets of the feminist politics of 
sexual pain Labuski argues for. However, even if we accept Labuski’s account of 
physical therapy -which seems highly flawed from a number of perspectives, her 
vision of a feminist politics of medicine does not challenge Cacchioni’s point that 
although medical help might be beneficial, it still works on an individual basis. They 
also differ in the way that Cacchioni sees physical therapy as a possibly 
demedicalized, do it yourself approach whereas Labuski prefers a type of it that 
requires expert attention. Both accounts frame the real political issue as addressing 
the social conditions that create women’s sexual oppression, with feminist politics of 
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medicine functioning only as far as promoting one treatment over others. 
The critical assumption that guides both of these works is that medicine, or 
some forms of medicine, hides “the real” social thus political nature of the problem 
by representing it in terms of an individual’s biology and psychology. Real nature 
thus implies a causal relation that originates in the social world and its political 
organization - with the emphasis on the political organization of gender- that ends up 
with chronic sexual pain being inscribed on women’s bodies. The major weakness of 
this scheme, however, lies in the problem of actually explaining how the political 
organization of gender causes the type of oppression understood as chronic sexual 
pain. What are the conditions that produce embodied chronic sexual pain? Even 
though, for example, Labuski is relatively confident that there is a link between 
sexual abuse and chronic sexual pain, she is unable to account for the mediating 
factors between the two. As of yet, neither sexual orientation, religion, race, ethnicity 
or class explain why some women experience it as they do, or how these experiences 
might facilitate, or bend gendered embodiment towards chronic pain. 
It is important here to ask what enables the confidence with which these 
arguments are made, without or despite empirical evidence. I argue that what 
influences and makes this move possible is avoiding a discussion of sexual pain as a 
common part of women’s sexual lives and experiences. The ghost of the possibility 
of pain with intercourse, almost always present as a possibility in the world, haunts 
these analyses of sexual pain disorders. Both accounts start by acknowledging that 
there is a  difference between chronic sexual pain and ‘normal’ or common sexual 
pain, but neither the status of common pain nor the original division between these 
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two types is addressed. This primary evasion allows the authors to treat all sexual 
pain as the same pain, which underneath the guises of sexual disorders of pain, of 
perception, of cultural and theoretical explanations, remains the common one. 
Common sexual pain with intercourse is a part of women’s sexual landscape 
both in terms of cultural myths and expectations as well as in terms of experience. 
Results of a recent U.S. nationally representative survey show that 30% of women 
experienced pain during their most recent vaginal intercourse experience, while men 
reported %7. (Herbenick, Schick, Sanders, Reece & Fortenberry, 2015). According 
to the findings, about 2/3 of men and 43% of women didn’t bring up the pain with 
their partners due to different reasons which include thinking it as normal, not 
important or not important to their partners. Whereas most men described pain as “a 
little” and none as “quite a bit” or “extremely” painful, women’s descriptions cover a 
considerable range from a little to moderately painful and quite a bit painful. It seems 
that good and bad sex has gendered definitions. According to Debby Herbenick, one 
of the authors of the report, "When it comes to 'good sex’ women often mean without 
pain, men often mean they had orgasms" (Loofbourow, 2018). The results of the 
survey reflected that for men the quality of sex is measured through pleasure, while 
for women being free from pain is an important variable in measuring the quality of 
intercourse. These results shows that the definitions of good and bad sex are 
gendered, consistent with Sara McClelland’s assertion that “ ...for men bad sex might 
refer to less satisfaction, whereas for women it includes the possibility of emotional 
and physical harm” (McClelland, 2009). 
It seems that some degree of pain is common for women in sex(ual 
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intercourse). Why does one gender consistently draw the short straw when it comes 
to sex and what does it tell us about the gendered politics of sex? This old and a 
rather unfashionable question calls forth the infamous “sex wars” of second-wave 
feminism which dealt with (heterosexual) penetrative sex itself as a problem that 
needs to be addressed.  
I argue that both authors’ approaches and arguments are crafted from a 
politics of gendered sexuality whose actual object is women’s common sexual pain -
or rather the very commonness of sexual pain- but they present them as arguments 
about chronic sexual pain. Reasons of common sexual pain are often listed as stress, 
fatigue, lack of arousal or lubrication, or partner roughness. Cacchioni refers it once 
as “... infrequent pain with intercourse or pain caused by particularly rough or violent 
sex” (p.48) This kind of pain is assumed to emerge in the moment, in that particular 
sexual act, last for a short while without long term consequences. It is specific to the 
situation, and depends on how that situation unfolds between partners, as opposed to 
the chronic pain medical and feminist perspectives I attend here focus on. But this 
conceptual slippage between common and chronic pain allows them to problematize 
these women’s desire for “normal” sex and represent women as misled agents of 
their oppression. Problematizing heterosexuality, or sexual repression through the 
bodies and lives of heterosexual women with dyspareunia rather than all women is 
only possible if one does not acknowledge or attribute any importance to the 
commonness of sexual pain or deny that it exists altogether. 
In other terms, these explanations understand chronic sexual pain as a 
condition that emerges due to an intensification of gendered sexual oppression that is 
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also the cause of common sexual pain. If we accept that underlying causes are same 
for both situations, then common pain becoming chronic can be explained by a 
difference in the quantity or quality of experiences of women, which may be 
measured through social analysis. However, because both accounts largely depend on 
experiences of white, middle-class women with no visible disabilities, it is not 
possible to discuss the social causes of intensification through anything other than the 
seemingly uniform category of gender. 
Problem with using chronic pain as a metaphor for gendered sexual 
oppression is twofold. On the one hand, it further marginalizes a condition that is 
already and commonly defined by its invisibility as both authors acknowledge 
women often don’t come forward with their condition to seek help, neither from 
doctors nor from their friends and family. In the case that they do they don’t receive 
the care they need. On the other hand, situating and discussing sexual pain this way 
protects the illusion of pain-free (healthy, or good) sex as the normal and usual 
experience. 
 
MEDICAL DISCOURSES ON SEXUAL PAIN  
 
Changes to DSM-V came after an increasing number of medical studies and 
clinical trials on sexual pain disorders over the past decade, which revealed a wide 
range of problems and complications associated with classifying female sexual 
disorders of pain under the two different categories of vaginismus and dyspareunia. 
Many of the symptoms that overlap between these two diagnosis’ and increasing 
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research raised doubts to whether they could simply be separated from each other, as 
experiencing pain during and after intercourse (dyspareunia)  and inability to have 
intercourse due to unconscious muscle spasm(vaginismus). Considering that 
dyspareunia can trigger vaginismus, these intersecting symptoms raised doubt about 
the mutual exclusivity of such experiences. This reconceptualization also reworked 
the assumed etiological differences between the two, dyspareunia as organic and 
vaginismus as psychological. 
According to DSM-V, a woman is diagnosed with genital pelvic pain disorder 
only if she has clinically significant distress with one or more of the following 
symptoms for at least 6 months (1) difficulties with vaginal penetration during 
intercourse, (2) genito-pelvic pain during vaginal intercourse or penetration attempts, 
(3) fear or anxiety associated with genito-pelvic pain or vaginal penetration, or (4) 
tightness of the pelvic floor muscles during attempted vaginal penetration. Clinically 
significant distress clause exists for all female sexual dysfunctions and underscores 
that if women are not distressed by being unable to have intercourse, they are not 
supposed to be identified as suffering from a disorder. DSM-V also cautions that the 
cause of the distress should not be the result of partners difference in desire for 
intercourse, meaning that if a woman is fine with not having intercourse but stressed 
due to her partners' demands, she would not get a diagnosis, at least in theory. DSM-
V points out a number of things a physician should carefully take note of before 
making a diagnosis, including whether the patient is going through some big changes 
in life such as moving, changing jobs, having kids and so on and/or having 
relationship problems with their partner, or other significant people in their lives. 
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DSM-V also cautions that, for women to partake in pleasurable intercourse, they 
need some good foreplay and attention to their clitoris - although it is put in a more 
clinical language. In a way, DSM-V does acknowledge that  sex and sexual problems 
are not separate from the rest of one’s life, that some women seek treatment because 
they are pressured by their partners and they would not have done so in a different 
situation, that these problems commonly occur due to a partner’s inconsiderate or 
inadequate behavior in and out of bed, and yet still strives to function as a diagnosis 
manual.  
Rather than exploring the organizing logic and theories of DSM as a whole to 
critique its framing of sexual dysfunctions, I find it more useful to treat it as a 
patchwork of conflicting demands and forces, as they operate in the world DSM is 
only a part of, due to its role as  mediator between the reality of a doctors office and 
the ever-changing rhetorics on sex and sexuality. On the one hand, DSM-V shows us 
that feminist critiques of medicalization have managed to establish themselves as 
powerful rhetoric. On the other hand, it shows us the limits of existing rhetoric for 
mediating reality, as far as it continues to function as a diagnostic manual. 
Almost two decades ago, a group of researchers started challenging the 
dominant medical discourse on sexual disorders of pain. These challenges targeted 
the validity of diagnostic criteria, as well as standard treatment options by pointing 
out the lack of empirical evidence and controlled research about dyspareunia and 
vaginismus. Binik, probably the most prominent and influential challenger, who is 
part of the group responsible for the recent changes in DSM-V, pointed out that 
medical literature on vaginismus and dyspareunia can be traced back to three 
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thousand years, but their conceptualizations as primarily sexual problems emerged 
after the Freudian revolution in the 20th century, and that conceptualization remained 
unchanged even though dominance of psychodynamic theories waned from 
American psychiatry (1999). Critics of this conceptualization as “sexual” argue that 
it focuses on “ability to be penetrated as a fundamental determinant of sexual 
function in women” (Rosenbaum 2018). 
This emerging body of research engaged with chronic sexual pain in different 
ways, including controlled studies measuring and comparing the effectiveness of 
common treatments such as CBT, biofeedback, surgery, pharmaceutical treatments. 
Treatment goals were reconsidered in light of the critique that penetration as a goal 
without considering pleasure was not enough. More recent studies focus on bisexual 
and lesbians, challenging the notion that only heterosexual women experience 
vaginismus and dyspareunia, and examining how same-sex relationships may have 
an effect on the experience of vulva-vaginal pain (Sobecki-Rausch, Brown & Gaupp, 
2017). There is a lot of interest in designing multi-model treatments that address 
psychological, interpersonal and physical aspects of pain and clinical trials show 
positive results, though there are no controlled studies yet (Bergeron, Corsini-Munt, 
Aerts, Rancourt & Rosen 2015; Meana, Fertel & Maykut, 2017). 
Comparison of different treatments reveals interesting results. Researchers 
found that although surgery for vulvar vestibulitis (one of the most common subtypes 
of dyspareunia with no obvious biological component other than pain) produced 
quickest results, cognitive behavior therapy also produced similar levels of success. 
Lidocaine, a numbing cream once prescribed as a first line treatment, is now 
  27 
considered no more effective than placebo. Noting that rather than what specific 
method of treatment is used, how the treatment is accomplished seems to make a 
difference, researchers become interested in how social and cognitive aspects of 
treatment and pain management, such as relationship factors, doctor-patient 
relationship and patient cognition towards treatment might affect treatment. Based on 
the most recent reviews, psychological treatments are recommended as first-line 
treatments for medical interventions. Pelvic floor physical therapy is another 
recommended approach, and manual pelvic floor therapy is considered promising, 
although there are no randomized controlled trials for it yet and some experts are 
cautious about the limits of a Physical Therapy only approach, due to possible 
harmful effects on women (Rosenbaum, 2018). 
Recent approaches share a renewed interest in discussing the matter from a 
psychosocial perspective. Effectiveness of psychological intervention, coupled with 
perplexing improvements in a large percentage of women who don’t receive any 
treatment suggest that psychosocial circumstances have an important effect in the 
manifestation and management and treatment of chronic vulva-vaginal pain. It is 
suggested that experience of pain (with birth, intercourse or during first tampon 
insertion) coupled with fear and anxiety might explain the onset of chronic pain. 
Self-efficacy is shown to be a differentiating factor in effective treatment and pain 
relief, and there is an increased focus on how positive cognition effects treatment. 
Interestingly, it seems that women who attribute pain to physical reasons rather than 
psychosocial causes seem to have less stress and lower rates of pain. 
Of course, it is not possible to talk about a total conceptual or practical shift 
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when it comes to how vaginismus and dyspareunia are understood and treated in 
medical settings. Among the researchers, the only consensus is that better clinical 
trials and research are necessary to assess how these treatments work for different 
women. The approaches I outlined above are relatively new, and not every 
practitioner is in favor of current trends. The suggestion that this new combined 
category should be moved out of sexual dysfunctions and moved under chronic pain 
conditions received mixed responses and was not enacted in DSM-V. Those in favor 
of this move argue that the category needs desexualization, as neither the symptoms 
nor treatment are sexual. Furthermore, it has been suggested that the entire field of 
sex therapy is only defined by its willingness to engage with sexuality, rather any 
distinct mode of therapeutic intervention special to sexuality. For example, some 
argue that this specialization separates matters of sexuality from rest of the therapy 
enterprise, creating an artificial division between sexual problems, relationship 
issues, other psychological difficulties, and important life concerns and contributes to 
the societal discomfort with issues of sexuality.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The vision of justice emerging from feminist engagements with pain leaves 
something to be desired, in the way that they approach the issue from limited 
perspectives, including what is political about sexuality, and how sexuality is related 
to politics. This is in part due to understanding the problem only in terms of 
(hetero)sexuality and gender, without considering how it can also be considered as a 
matter of ability-disability. Experiences of women (and women themselves) 
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represented in these accounts mostly exist to provide an object of analysis for the 
authors for their respective critiques of medicine and culture. In these accounts, 
women do not emerge as subjects whose experiences, desires and thoughts can 
inform the political visions weaved through, and on behalf of them, something 
critical to feminist disability approaches. Instead of complicating and enhancing 
feminist theorizing on the embodiment, agency, identity, and ethics in the 
entanglements of medicine and sexuality, these experiences are cast aside, either as 
moral or political failings.  
These two problems are linked by a tendency to understand and analyze 
sexuality primarily through gender. Gender, in return, is presented as a relatively 
stable category for organizing experience. On the one hand, these feminists are able 
to present a critique of gendered sexual oppression reminiscent of second-wave 
feminist interrogations of sexual oppression and heterosexuality in what is 
considered a post-feminist era of sex. On the other hand, they use sexual disabilities 
(if we borrow the term from Zulch) as a shortcut, sacrificing its difference as a 
specific form of embodiment/oppression, along with its potential for producing a 
productive and transformative politics.  
    Cacchioni’s critique of medicalization can be read parallel to the social model of 
disability in several ways, including a marked effort to distance subjects of the 
analysis from the category of disorder, and reading impairment/sexuality divide in a 
way that privileges a rational subject untouched by the materiality of experience. 
It can be argued Labuski avoids these problems by emphasizing how sexual 
impairment is produced by social and political contexts of women’s lives. However, 
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her analysis fails to take into account both the diversity of women’s concerns and the 
causes of their problems. She operates within a normative framework in which 
sexuality is largely defined by politics of gender, defined and understood in 
traditional ways: sexual education, religious oppression, sexual abuse, and 
conservative attitudes come to define the gendered experience of sexuality. One can 
perhaps overlook this focus if it didn’t blindside the author herself to problems of her 
approach. When a survivor of sexual abuse, who we are told is an older Christian 
woman, feels uncomfortable and triggered during a recommended physical therapy 
session, Labuski fails to recognize that perhaps the problem lies with the mode of the 
treatment rather than “faint-heartedness” of women who seek solutions.  
As Cacchioni emphasises, it is not likely that medical solutions to chronic 
pelvic pain will be popular due to how expensive getting treatment is. It is still 
important that patients to have more of a say in what kind of treatment they will be 
getting. Though we don’t know  how “self-efficacy” exactly helps, it does suggest 
that patients feelings of agency matter. Rather than the type of treatment feminist 
politics should look at the whole process of diagnosis and treatment, including the 
processes through which people are given and refused diagnosis.This perspective 
have to address that some women with chronic pelvic pain issues are not interested in 
getting treatment for penetrative sex but are directed to sex therapy nonetheless. 
On a different note, a feminist disability approach has to consider both 
patients and feminists insistence that problem is not “in their heads”. This insistence, 
at least for people with chronic come from their experiences with health providers 
who dismiss their pain as not being real by saying it is in their heads. Recent 
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orientations in medicine consider how minds, nerves, genitals, interpersonal and 
social realities all facilitate the experience of pain while also acknowledging that 
dismissing patients concerns have an impact on worsening pain intensity.  
However, medical models return to psychology also has to be approached 
with caution in terms of making easy connections between pain and social 
phenomena. For example, there seems to be a renewed emphasis on the effect of 
religion, mainly due to number of complaints coming in from Turkey and other 
middle eastern countries. Transnational differences have to carefully accounted for 
these comparisons to make sense, as numbers are not natural indicatives of reality. 
A feminist politics need to go beyond a critique of medicalization to actively 
transform medical research and intervene to social/political contexts of sex. This 
means to influence and deepen research on sex and sexual pain, and also producing 
better accounts of sexual pain (and desire, and sexual experiences in general) that 
connect a wide range of experiences together. Especially, a feminist politics of 
sexuality should consider common pain itself seriously and produce sexual politics 
against oppressive sexual norms. Medical research reveals that about 40% of no 
treatment control groups also achieve similar results with treatment groups, which 
reveal the importance of interpersonal and social mechanisms in play. This would 
necessitate of a study that can show how different sexual scripts become accessible 
to different people and how they travel through  libidinal economies. Instead of 
limiting the study of sexual pain to clinic patients, and relying on a medical 
definition of painful/painless, future research should explore pain as it manifests in 
and out of clinics.  
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What kind of strategies people use to avoid pain in sexual and romantic encounters? 
How understandings of normal and abnormal pain are created in daily life and 
managed? Such research cannot limit itself to able-bodied heterosexuality or 
cissexuality. Lesbians, bisexuals, transmen, and experiences of trans women who 
undergo sex reassignment surgery should be included in these narratives of managing 
pain. How different identities learn and manage to overcome shame and stigma 
attached to sex, and navigate painful experiences can bolster a new cultural politics 
of sex and illuminate the ways people exercise sexual agency in different ways. 
Instead of focusing on (proving) the primacy of social origins rather than bodily 
origins, this perspective must attend to material and ideological that organize 
relations between the two, for different women of class/race/ethnicity/age/ability.  
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